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BACKGROUND INFOIW.TION 
1HE EUROPEAN C()MJNI'IY AND 1HE UNITED STATFS: .1972 
This background note is an updated version of "The Monetary 
and Commercial Relations Between the Community and the United 
States: Facts and Figures," published in October 1971 by the 
Spokernan t s Group. · 
INrRODUCriON 
Events dUring the past year have shown how closely intertwined the world's 
econaiiies are. Prosperity can be internationally contagious; but 
inflation, unemployment,,~ stagnation can likewise be infectious. This 
places a special responsibility on the world's two major trading powers 
and trading partners for maintaining botn good relations between themselves 
and an auspicious climate for international economic relations. 
,. 
The O:mnunity recognized this responsibility and played a major role 
i,n resolving last year's international monetary crisis. The Conmunity member 
states were instrtll\ental in achieving the Qll'l'ency realigmnent in Washington 
Decsnber 18. Following that, the Callllission in February negotiated a tx:ade 
agreement with the United States, which marked an important milestone in 
·;relations between the United States and the European Camnmity. It was 
with the desire to free ~rld camnerce further that the Camn.mity proposed 
new global trade negotiations. This initiative opened the way for the 
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declaration made by the Cormrunity, Japan, and the lhlited States "to initiate 
I 
and actively support multilateral and comprehensive negotiations in the framework 
of GAIT [General Agreanent on Tariffs and Trade] beginning in 1973 with a view 
to the expansion and the ever greater lib'-'ralization of world trade and 
improvement in the standard of living of the people of the world." 
The following report deals with the various issues which are currently 
being discussed between the lhlited States and. the European Community. 
I • GrNERAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT 
Since the establishnent of the European Community in 1958, trade between 
the two partners has been extremely beneficial for both sides of the Atlantic •. 
The rapidly rising standard of living in the .vast market of the European 
Conmon Market and the diminishing barriers to ccmnerce in Europe made it an 
attractive export market, especially for .American consuner products and capital 
goods. 
A major additional reason f~r the spectacular growth of American exports 
to Europe was the low level of the Conmuni ty' s conmon . external tariff. This 
was established as an average of the previously existing tariffs of the six 
member states. In post-Kennedy RoWld rates, for example, only 13.1 per cent 
of European Econanic Conmunity (EEC) tariffs on industrial goods are over 10 
per cent and 2.4 per cent are over 15 per cent, compared to 38.3 per cent of 
American tariffs over 10 per cent and 23.7 per cent over 15 per cent. The 
European Cbmmunity today has the lowest tariff of the major industrial areas: 
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Average Tariffs on Industrial Products (percentages) 
Raw Materials Sani-Manuf. Fin. -Manu£. All Industrial Products 
EC 0.6 6.2 8.7 6.0 
United States 3.8 8.3 .8.1 7.1 
Japan 5.5 ·9.3 12.0 9.7 
United Kingdom 1.2 8.3 10.4 7.6 
(Source: "Basic Ik>c1..1nentation for the Tariff Study," GATI, 1971) 
Since 1958 the Community has been a rapidly growing market for American 
exports. In 1958 the United States exported $2.8 billionCl) worth of goods to 
the Canmunity and :imported $1.7 billion worth from it. By 1971 American exports 
had grown to $9.0 billion and ~ports had risen to $7.7 billion. 
The growth of American exports to the Community has been faster than 
toward· ma.'ly other areas of the world. According to American statistics~ 
from 1960 (the first year of the European Free Trade Association) to 1971, 
American exports to the EFTA col.Dltries grew by 81 per cent. furing the same 
period American exports to all areas rose by 115 per cent; they increased by 
143 per cent toward the Cornml.Dlity. 
The European Camml.Dlity since 1958 has run a constant and large trade 
deficit with the United States, averaging $1.7 billion annually. (See Table I). 
In 1971 this deficit amol.Dlted to $1.3 billion. The Community was the only 
major industrialized area with which the· United States ran a trade surplus in 
1971, the year the US overall tr~e deficit amounted to $2 billion. 
II. AGRICULTURE 
American officials have often stated that the Community's agricultural policy 
is excessively protectionist and harmful to American interests. The figures 
of American agricultural exports to the Conmuni ty do not, however, support 
such charges. All statistics used here are US Department of .Agriculture 
figures. 
(1) All dollar figures in this report are at the pre-Decanber 18, 1971, rate of 
$1 = 0.888~grams fine gold. 
. t,?t 
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The European Conmuni ty is the most important market 'ror American agricultural 
exports. In 1964, the last full trade year prior to the beginning of the 
introduction of the common agricultural policy, US agricultural exports 
amotmted to $1.227 billion. By 1971 these had risen to $1.74 7 billion. lliring 
the last seven years American agricultural exports have increased 42 per cent 
to the Conlmm.ity, while increasing only 26 per cent to the rest of the world. 
Since its establishment the Community's percentage of total American agricultural 
exports has remained relatively stable and actually increased in 1971. In 1958 
the EEC accounted for 21.3 per cent. of the total American agricultural export 
market, in 1964 21. 7 per cent, and in 1971 24. 5 per cent. 
Conmuni ty agricultural exports to the United States , on the contrary, are 
much smaller. In 1958 the Cammtmity exported $205 million in fann products to 
the United States; by 1971 this had risen to nearly $423 million. With linports 
of $1.747 billion, the Conmunity in 1971 thus had an agricultural trade deficit 
of $1.324 billion with the United States. 
In all industrial countries, agriculture is the "problem child" of development, 
as governments seek to assure agricultural workers a just inccme. Fanning is 
an especially important sector of the Community's economy, employing 13 per cent 
of the active population. In sane regions (southern Italy, for example), over 
50 per cent of workers are on the land. .Agriculture comprises only 4. 5 per cent 
of the American labor force. 
All major industrial nations support the income of agricultural workers 
by one method or another. N:> industrial cotmtry allows free and unhindered trade 
in agricultural products. 
The US government uses the income support method cambined with quantitative 
import restrictions on many agricultural products to protect its fanners. The 
United States maintains quotas or receives "voluntary" export self-limitations 
on: wheat, wheat flour, sugar, cotton, peanuts, most milk products, beef, and 
mutton. MOst recently candy and confectionery products have also been subjected 
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to import quotas. The tmited States operates most of these restrictions via a 
1955 waiver to GATT rules, which allows it to limit the importation 
of most agricultural products. Nearly half of ftmerican agricultural production, 
according to GATT estimates, is shielded by these quantitative restrictions. 
The Community's main method of assuring agricultural incane is by guaranteed 
prices and variable levies on a number of Dnportant commodities, such as wheat, 
corn, and milk products. On other products, such as mutton, tobacco, and fruits 
and vegetables, there are import duties. There are virtually no quantitative 
restrictions. Today more than 40 per cent of :American agricultural exports, 
including soybeans and soycakes, which last year accounted for nearly $800 
million in sales, enter the Conmuni ty duty-free. Agricultural products canprise 
18 per cent of American exports to the Community; 5 per cent of the total exports 
are subject to the variable levy of the common agricultural policy. 
The difficulty of comparing the differing American and Go.mmunity methods 
of agricultural protection and income support can best be illustrated by an 
example. The Cbmmunity's variable levy on butter in 1969 was higher than 
300 per cent. The ftmerican duty on butter was 10..:15 per cent, but the ftmerican 
market is protected by a quasi-prohibition of butter Dnports via quotas. The 
Go.mmuni ty, however, imported ten times more butter than the United States. 
More important than the method of income support for agricultural workers 
is the result. An independent study of expertsC2) ·has estimated that the 
Conmuni ty supports each agricultural worker by same $860 annually. The 
corresponding figure for the United States is $1,320 a year. 
The problem of European agriculture today is a social problan. Too many 
workers are fanning small inefficient holdings that are incompatible with modern, 
mechanized agriculture. The average Camnunity fann in 1970 was 12.6 hectares; 
the average American far.m in 1970 was 157.5 hectares. The percentage of the 
working population on the far.m in the Conununity is three times that of the 
United States. 
(2) "Comparaison entre le soutien accorde a !'agriculture aux Etats-Unis et 
dans la Cbmmunaute," by Professors G. Vandewalle and W. Meeusen, 1971, 
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In March 1972 the first directives of the so-called "Mansholt Plan" 
were adopted by the EC Council of Ministers. This plan a~s at the modernization 
of Community agriculture, establishing it on a competitive level in world markets 
and also raising the level of prosperity for European farmers. These first 
directives call for spending a total of 830 million units of account (UC) (3) 
in Community funds during the next five years to encourage the formation of 
larger, economically rationalized farms. Supplementary funds will be spent by 
the six member governments. To facilitate adjustment of the agricultural 
population, an annual stipend of 900 UC for a married couple or 600 UC for a 
single man will be given to farmers aged SS to 6S who leave the land. This 
will ease the social problems created by the existing trend toward a dwindling 
agricultural population in the Community. In 19 SO, 20 million persons were 
employed .in agriculture; by 1970 farm employment had declined to 10 million; 
by 1980 it will drop to S million. As a part of the total active population, 
agricultural employment declined from 28 per cent in 19SO to 13 per cent in 1970; 
it will form an estimated 6 per cent. in 1980. 
In February 1972 the lhrited States and the Community reached an agreement 
on several agricultural issues, including grain stockpiling, citrus fruit,and 
tobacco. On the same occasion both sides concurred to initiate the long-term 
multilateral negotiations \vi thin GATT during 1973, which will cover both 
industrial and agricultural products. The Community maintained that one means 
of achieving order in world agriculture is through international commodity 
agreements. Such agreements are ~portant for developed regions, such as Europe 
and America, but crucial for the developing countrie~ which despite efforts 
at economic diversificati~ still depend heavily on agricultural exports. 
III. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
The postwar movement of trade liberalization has been most successful in 
removing tl1e high walls of tariff protectionism on industrial goods erected 
during the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s. As tariffs have came down, however, the incidence 
'11 
(3) 1 Unit of Account = $1.085~. 
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of non-tariff barriers on trade has taken on greater significance. 
The GATT has made an inventory of more tl1an 800 non-tariff measures . 
.American spokesmen camplain about "unfair trading practices," implying that 
the United States is the world's only truly free market. Yet, according to 
the GATT inventory, all countries are "siimers" in the field of non-tariff 
barriers. The United States is among the countries against which the most 
complaints have been leveled. Restrictive trading practices exist on every 
side; and a major task of the new round of trade negotiations will be to seek 
a reciprocal dismantling of non-tariff barriers by the United States, the 
Community, Japan, and other trading countries. 
The process of integration within the Gammon Market has already steadily 
decreased the nunberand the magnitude of non-tariff barriers by the Six. 
"Obstacles to trade" within the Common Market, such as subsidies to shipbuilding, 
the Italian statistical tax,and teclmical standards, have been harmonized, 
reduced, or removed over the past decade to facilitate trade among the Six. 
At the same time, this process has benefited outside countries. 
* The Value Added Tax. Wide misunderstanding exists in the United States 
concerning the Cammmity's fiscal system of value added tax (VAT), which is 
sometimes regarded as a non-tariff trade barrier. The VAT has been adopted 
by the Community as a means of harmonizing the disparate European tax systems, 
an essential prerequisite for establishing an economic union. Five of the 
Community countries have adopted the VAT, and Italy will soon follow suit. 
After establishing the same fiscal system, the next step will be to harmonize 
the taxation level. Community members currently maintain varying VAT rates. 
The VAT, like the sales tax in 46 of the 50 .American states, is a so-called 
indirect tax. The trading rules of GATT permit border adjustments on 
indirect taxes so that foreign and domestic products compete on an equal footing. 
On products exported from the state of Pennsylvania, for example, the 6 per cent 
state sales tax need not be paid. Likewise both locally produced and imported 
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goods are taxed 6 per cent .when sold within the state. The VAT is more 
complicated since the tax is collected on the value added at every step of 
production, rather than on the retail price. In order to 
equalize competition under the VAT system, the amount of tax paid is refunded 
when the good is exported. This is done following the accepted international 
principle that indirect taxes should be paid where the product is consumed. 
' 
Inside the Conmuni ty market, an importer pays a tax on the imported good equal 
to that which the local manufacturer has already paid. Thus neither the 
domestic nor tl1e imported product has any tax advantage. 
Both the GATT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) made extensive inquiries into the trade effects of the VAT and 
both concluded that the tax was neutral and did not distort competition between 
exports and imports. 
The ~S Administration is studying the VAT with a view to its possible 
introduction in the United States. 
* American Non-Tariff Barriers. The purpose in the following is not to draw 
up any exhaustive list of complaints of "unfair American trading practices" 
but rather to illustrate some of the areas of Cormnunity concern: 
1) quantitative Restrictions. From 1963 to the end of 1970, tl1e number 
of tariff categories covered by American quantitative restrictions rose from 
7 to 67. In 1971 the number of these increased again with the introduction 
of quotas on chocolates and confectionery goods and by the so-called "voluntary 
self-restraint" on exports to the United States of synthetic and woolen 
textiles by four Asian countries. Such quantitative restrictions limit the 
amount of a product which can be imported into a country either via quotas 
or via voluntary self-limitations by the exporting country. These 
restrictions are generally much more harmful to trade than tariffs since 
they set absolute limits on the ainount of an itan that can be imported. During 
the same 1963·70 period, the number of items covered by quantitative restrictions 
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applied by the member states of the Camm.mity fell from 76 to 65. In addition, 
there are 37 restrictions especially applied to Japan in one or another member 
state, and seven more Japanese products are subject to restrictions in all member 
states. 
Nearly one-fifth of all American industrial nnports are cover~d by 
quantitative restrictions. This incl-udes a wide range of goods from brooms 
,. 
to petroleun products. The American economist C. Fred Bergsten)has estimated 
non-tariff barriers affect about $100 billion of US consumption annually. 
The Community has the lowest percentage of industrial imports subject to 
quantitative restrictions of any major trading entity. Such import restrictions 
affect 4.3 per cent of industrial imports. 
One of the most disturbing new American practices is the so-called 
"vohmtary self-lnnitation" restrictions, whereby an exporting country agrees 
to lnnit exports on a number of important products such as textiles and steel. 
2) Valuation Practices. Al. though its removal was part of the "chemical 
package" in the Kennedy Round, the ".American Selling Price" is still used 
today, for lack of Congressional action. Under this method of valuation, duties 
on products such as benzenoid chemicals and their derivatives such as dyes, 
pesticides, phannaceuticals, and plastics, are established not according to 
the value of the imported product but according to the price of the same American 
produced goods~ Other methods of valuation, such as those applied under the 
"Final List," are extremely ccmplicated and generate incertitude. 
3) Goverrment Purchases. The "Buy American Act of 1933" requires the 
national Governnent to purchase American-made products unless the .American 
product. is either not available or costs 6 per cent (in same areas 12 per cent) 
more than the foreign product. The US Department of Defense requires that 
foreign-produced goods must cost 50 per cent less than the American product 
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and also maintains a long list of products , including food and clothing, where 
the foreign good may not be purchased at any price. Other col.Dltries, including 
those in the European Camnunity, practice "administrative discretion" in their 
public purchases. In the united States this is done particularly at the state 
and local levels. 
4) Administrative Obstacles. A wide variety of administrative controls 
also impede or complicate Camnunity exports to the united States. No foreign-
made vessel, for example, can do shi-pping between two ports along the American 
coast. The ''Marks of Origin" requirement adds to production costs and can 
result in discrimination against foreign goods. The United States, in addition, 
does not conform to the accepted international rules on "dunping" and 
"cotmtervailing duties." Special·American rules and the recent proliferation 
of their use can becane a barrier to trade. From July 1, 1970, to Jtme 30, 1971, 
the American Govenll1ent started 22 new anti -dunping procedures. Illring the 
same period the Conmuni ty, which complies with the GATI' anti -dumping code, 
started only one new procedure. 
5) DISC. TI1e Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) Act became 
law in December 1971. This statute, unique to the United States, allows tax 
deferrals on SO per cent of profits to American firms conducting 95 per cent 
of their business in exports.· 
In practice, large American companies are establishjng "paper subsidiaries" 
to qualify as DISC's. The 50 per cent "tax deferral" becanes "tax exemption" 
since it is never taxed as long as the profits are not distributed to stockholders 
but instead are reinvested for export developnent. 
The Coomtmity on Ck:tober 5, 1971, in a note verbale to the American GovenJilent 
said: "The DISC tax arrangement would involve very considerable exemption from 
direct taxes on profits and would be such as to encourage exports artificially 
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by reducing prices. This exemption would be incompatible with the commitments of 
the United States under the General Agreement as regards export subsidies and 
would involve the risk of serious disturbances in international competition." 
IV. .AMERICAN INVES'IMENT IN EUROPE 
American investment in Europe today plays an important role in the.total 
picture of economic relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
Since 1958 the book value of American direct investment in the Community 
has grown sixfold, rising from $1.9 billion to $11.7 billion in 1970. SUch 
figures take into account only investments made by .American finns d.irectly 
from the United States and do not include investments by .American holding 
companies located, for example, in Switzerland, Luxembourg, or the Bahamas. 
In the past decade the Gammunity has been the fastest growth area for .American 
direct investment. In 1958, investment in the Community, largely in petroleum, 
canprised only 7 per cent of total .American investment abroad. By 1970 the 
Caununity proportion had grown to 15 per cent of all .American investments 
and three-fifths of it. was by then in manufacturing. 
The growth of direct .American investment, however, is more accurately seen 
from the figures for the annual expenditure of .American capital investment in 
the Conmunity. Capital expenditure is made up of capital transferred from the 
United States, capital raised in Europe, and reinvested earnings. .Armual 
capital expenditures in the six Ccmmuni.ty countries were $420 million in 1958 
but are estimated at $3.3 billion for 1972. 
This .American direct investment has an. impact on .American exports to 
Europe and thus on the .American-Conmunity balance of trade. Today more and 
more American products, from computers to detergents, are produced in Europe 
and are no longer being exported from the United States. In 1968, the last 
year for which complete figures are available, the sales of American manufacturing 
subsidiaries located within the Comnnmi ty totaled $14 billion. This was an 
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increase from $12 billion in 1967 and $4.8 billion in 1961. Thus, in 1968, 
the sales of manufacturing subsidiaries were nearly 2. 5 tmes the value of 
total .American exports to the Community and nearly four tmes the value of 
exports of manufactured products. It is impossible to ascertain the exact 
amount of .American exports which are displaced by production in Europe. But 
it is clear that a large degree of the capital migration from American to 
Europe was prompted by the conclusion of American companies that it was cheaper 
to produce in Europe than to export finished products from the united States. 
Conversely, direct Ccmnunity investment in the United States has not 
been large. The book value of this was $1.4 billion in 1960 and $3.5 billion 
in 1970. The reason for the low level of investment lies partly in lE. policy 
.~ ,..w•-' 
toward foreign investment. As stated in the Canrnission' s 1970 ''Memorandun 
on Industrial Policy," certain features of American legislation hinder direct 
foreign investment in the United States. In a whole series of industries, 
such as aviation, electrical, insurance, and manufacturing of alcoholic 
beverages, no foreign investments are allowed. American antitrust laws, in 
addition, are applied not only against American subsidiaries of foreign firms 
but also against the parent company for their activities outside the United 
States. This restriction has stopped many European fi~s from investing in 
the United States. The European Conununity, on the other hand, only applies 
its antitrust rules against parent companies for·their activities carried out 
either directly or through subsidiaries within the Canmunity. As is shown 
by the investment patterns of American firms in Europe, a convenient way of 
establishing a foothold or extending company operations in a market is the 
acquisition of existing fir.ms. Such transactions are often attacked in the 
United States by antitrust officials. 
The repatriation of profits from American subsidiaries abroad has 
recently become a major new source of revenue in the American balance of 
payments. Remitted income on total US direct investment abroad rose from 
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$2.95 b.illion in 1960 to $9.3 billion in 1971. In 1971 American finns in the 
Q:mmunity repatriated $1.2 billion, reinvesting the remaining profits in 
plant expansion in Europe. 
V. PREFERENTIAL AGREIMENTS 
Since its establishment the European Community has had association' treaties 
with 18 African countries. Other bilateral agreements have been negotiated 
with a series of Mediterranean countries (Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, 
Israel, and Malta) and with three East African countries (Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania). All these agreements are aUned at the establishment of free trade 
areas or customs unions under which substantially all the trade of the cOtmtries 
concerned will be progressively freed fran custans duties, thus fulfilling the 
rules of. GATI'. In the case of the original African agreements free trade has 
now been achieved. 
For most of these countries, the association agreement with the Community 
as a whole was a sequel to historic colonial ties between these countries 
and certain Conmuni ty' member states. The continuation of the previous trade 
agreements was an econanic necessity a~ well as a political responsibility 
for the Carmuni ty, since many of the nations send more than half of their 
exports to the European market. 
Other countries, which had no special histor.ic links with Camrunity 
member states, asked for a special relationship with the Community. Three 
principle reasons led the Community to respond positively: 
_. In the case of Greece and Turkey, the aim is to enable thes~ countries to 
becane full members when their econanies are more developed. In 1971 another 
step in this direction was taken with Turkey when that country accepted a 
schedule for establishing a gradual custans union with the Conmunity. 
_. In the case of the three East African states, it is the Cormrnmi ty' s 
declared intention, in the interest of equity, to accept requests for special 
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relationships from countries placed in a comparable economic situation to tl~ 
other less developed African countries already associated to the Common Market. 
*Association agreements with Spain, Israel, and Malta are intended to 
safeguard traditional ~conamic and commercial ties. 
The major purpose is to assist the econanic developnent of these 
cotmtries. This can be accomplished both through trade and aid. Most products 
entering the Gammtmity from the associated African states and Madagascar have 
been duty-free since July 1, 1968. Conversely, most products of the Conmunity 
enter the associated countries free of duty. Free trade is also envisaged 
in the Mediterranean association agreements. 
The Six· have also given Gammununity development aid above and beyond the 
aid programs of the member states. Since 1958, $2.229 billion has been 
granted to the 18 African states. In recent years, loan aid of $70 million 
was given to Greece and $175 million to Turkey. After ratification, a new aid 
protocol will give Turkey additional loans totaling $195 million. 
There is no evidence that the trade of any third country has been hanned 
as a result of these agreements. The United States, on the contrary, has 
increased its exports toward these countries at a faster rate than the 
European Coomtmi ty. From 1958-71, US exports to the 18 African cotmtries grew 
by 158 per cent. furing the same period, the Camnmity' s exports to them 
increased by only 97 per c~t. 
The Mediterranean agreements have been the most contested by the United 
States. This area, however, is of minor importance in /merican trade. The 
total Mediterranean area, excluding Italy and France, accounts· for only 6 per 
cent of US exports and 3 per cent of imports. The Camrunity's agreement with 
Greece (the oldest, dating from 1962) shows no discriminatory effects against 
/merican exports. In 1963-69, the growth of /merican exports to Greece averaged 
10.5 per cent canpared to 5.8 per cent for the total Mediterranean area. The aim 
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of the preferential agreements is the economic development of these countries. 
Both as a richer outlet for exports and because of the "trade creating effect" 
of any free trade area, the markets of these countries have been, and will 
continue to be, more attractive to US interests. 
Citrus fruit has been one of the products on which the Mediterranean 
countries have received preferential access to the Community market. Iri July 1971 
the Community in a unilateral gesture to the United States lowered its tariff 
on oranges for one year from 15 per cent to 8 per cent during the frur months 
of June through Septanber, the period when over 80 per cent of /lmerican 
oranges are exported to the Community. 
This February in bilateral negotiations with the United States, the Community 
agreed to lower its tariff on oranges for two additional years to 5 per cent 
during the four summer months and from 6 per cent to 4 per cent on grapefruit 
for two full years. 
A final but important element in the Camnunity' s Mediterranean policy 
is the contribution which Western Europe can make in this troubled, and potentially 
explosive, part of the world. As fonner Commission President Franco Maria 
Malfatti said, "It is difficult for us to understand why there is criticism of 
the Community's policy in the Mediterranean area. It is clear that such agreements 
are a first step towards an increased European presence in the Mediterranean 
area, as a factor for equilibrium and peace. I do not believe that anyone 
can contest the constructive role that can be played in Europe in relieving 
the strains and pressures felt by the countries bordering the Mediterranean. 
It is true that such a role cannot find full expression merely in giving same 
tariff advantage for a product such as citrus fruit. For the moment, the 
Gammunity does not have other instruments for assistance. The Commission is 
aware of this lack. We are trying and will continue to try to find better 
and more efficient means to realize our aims." 
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VI. JAPANffiE-cat.ruN11Y TRADE RELATICNS · 
As an explanation for the rapidly rising Japanese exports to the American 
market, American spokesmen have complained that this is due to European 
Community protectionism against Japanese products. This is a facile argument 
not borne out by the facts. 
Since the Camm.mi ty' s fotmding in 1958, Japanese-Ccmnunity trade has 
been one of the fastest growing in the world. In 1958 the Gammunity exported 
$139 million worth of goods to Japan and imported $117 million worth from 
Japan. In 1971 the Camn.mi ty imported $1. 542 billion from Japan and exported 
$937 million to Japan. In 1971 Japanese exports to the Ccmnunity rose by 
25 per cent over 1970. Japanese exports rose by 44 per cent to France and by 
45 per cent to the Netherlands. 
Prior to 1968 the COmmunity had a small but regular trade s~rplus with 
Japan, but since then it has had an ever-increasing trade deficit. In 1968 
the deficit was $16 million, in 1970 $245 million, and in 1971 $605 million. 
Historically, the United States has been a more important trader with 
Japan than has the Camnunity -- both for exports and for imports. ·In 1955, 
for example, 22.7 per cent of Japanese exports went to the US market and only 
4.0 per cent to the market of the six countries that now fonn the Comrm.mity • 
. In 1970,30.8 per cent of Japanese exports went to the United States and 6.7 
per cent to the Conmunity. A similar situation existed for Japanese imports: 
in 1955 the United States accounted for 31.3 per cent of Japanese imports,· 
while the Ccmnon Market "Six" supplied only 3.8 per cent. In ~970, the United 
States accotmted for 29. 4 per cent of Japanese imports, while the CoJimuni ty' s 
market share was only 5. 9 per cent. 
The causes for the different level of Canmunity-'Japanese trade as canpared 
to American -Japanese trade are many. Among the most important is the distance 
' 
between Japan and Europe and the resulting higher transportation costs. 
The distance between Tokyo and San Francisco, by air, is -8, 200 kilometers ; 
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the distance between Tokyo and Rotterdam, also by air, is 12,700 kilometers. 
The natural barrier of two oceans has limited trade between Asia and Europe. 
This has been true not only for conmerce with Japan but also with other 
Asian nations. 
Also limiting trade between Europe and Japan is the structure of industries 
and trade. lfnerican-Japanese conmerce .. .is naturally complementary,· with the 
Uhited States exporting mainly agricultural products and raw materials to 
Japan and importing Japanese manufactured products and machinery. Japanese 
and European industries, however, specialize and have their competitive 
trade advantage in almost the same fields. The two also trade each other almost 
the same products -- consuner goods, chemicals, classical capital goods, 
and machinery. In lfnerica, for example, the major competition in fields such 
as small autanobiles or consuner electronics comes not from J\merican products 
but rather from PA.lropean products. When this same competition is transferred 
to Europe, the local producer with low or nil transport costs has an obvious 
and important advantage over the product that has to be transported 12,700 
kilameters. 
The Japanese thus have concentrated on the closer lfnerican market, with 
a totally unified economy without any barriers to trade, with one language, 
200 million consumers, and the highest standard of living in the world. 
To take one important example -- automobiles. Japan in 1971 exported 
about 700,000 vehicles to the lhited States, with a large proportion 
being sold in the geqgraphically closer Pacific Coast area. In the lfnerican 
market one of the major competitors for the Japanese car is .the small 
European automobile. In 1971 Japan exported an estimated 120,000 vehicles 
to the COmmon Market. Only Italy maintains restrictions on importing Japanese 
automobiles. The explanation for the difference between Japanese auto exports 
to Europe and to the United States is clearly foUnd in the stronger competition 
the Japanese products face in the European market. 
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It is true that member states of the Camnmity still maintain sane 
quantitative restrictions against Japanese products, as does the l.hited 
States especially through the so-called ''voluntary self-limitations." The 
Camwnity is now negotiating its first cCJIIllercial agreement with Japan, 'Mlich 
will replace the four treaties of Benelux:, France, Gennany, and Italy. The 
aim of this new treaty will be reciprocal reduction by 75 per cent of the 
quotas in effect on Ja:ru.Jary 1, 1970. 
VII. TRADE AND 1HE M<l£rARY SITIJATION 
December 18, 1971, the world's ten leading industrial nations reached agreement 
on changing the parities of the major currencies. This ended the first 
phase of the international monetary crisis, which had begun with ·the floating 
of the West Gennan mark last May and of the linerican dollar last August. 
The member states of the Ccmnuni ty played an important role in the attainment 
of the December agreement in Washington. This involved their acceptance of a 
substantial devaluation of the l.E dollar as well as the revaluation of. some 
furopean currencies. Th.ese heavy revaluations will result in a camnercial 
handicap for the Ccmnuni.ty mari.ber states and a weakening of their international 
competitive position. This took place at a time when there also existed a less 
favorable economic situation in certain Gammunity countries. Currency revaluations 
vis-a-vis the US dollar were made by the followirig amounts: 
Gennany 
Netherlands 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
France 
Italy 
13.58% 
11.57% 
11.57% 
8. 57% 
7.48% 
The Washington agreement, however, was but the first step in the 
more fundamental refonn of the international monetary system. The Camnunity' s 
MOnetary Committee in its annual report recently wrote: ·~e realignment of 
exchange rates ended the uncertainties which resulted from the floating of 
currencies and whose negative effects on economic expansion and trade had 
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already begun to be felt in a nunber of com1tries. Nevertheless, the application 
of a mechanism better adapted to the present requirements presupposes that a 
certain number of other problems will be resolved concerning, in particular, 
the future system of convertibility, the role of gold, reserve currencies 
and special drawing rights, the stipply of adequate instruments of reserve, 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility, at the same time as the control of 
undesirable capital movements.'' 
In discussing the measures taken last August 15, the US Administration 
has stressed the trade aspects of the .American payments deficit. An analysis 
of the US balance of payments, however, shows clearly that such an explanation 
provides only a partial answer. .The origin of the payments disequilibriun must 
be found mainly in the continuing large outflows in short- and long-tenn .American 
capital. A Ccmm.m:ity representative told a GATI Cotmcil last August: "It 
should be recalled that for the united States the merchandise trade balance is 
relatively a small item in the balance of payments, particularly when compared 
with the item covering net receipts from direct investment abroad or the item 
showing the net outflow of capital to finance these direct investments." 
There is no doubt that there has been a decline in the .American trade 
surplus since the Sixties when it averaged $5.4 billion annually; yet in 1970 
the thited States still had a trade surplus of $2.1 billion. In 1971 the 
united States ran a trade deficit of over $2 billion, although as noted above 
it still had a large trade surplus with the Ccmntmity. This overall trade 
deficit was partially the result of temporary phenanena, such as extended 
dock strikes, persistent and high danestic inflation, and low productivity 
gains. It may also partially result from sane slowly moving structural changes 
in international trade, such as the strong .American increases in raw material 
imports, the change in the thited States from a ''manufacturing oriented" to 
a "service oriented" economy, and the impact of multinational corporations. 
The Camnmity considers, though, that it is not up to the United States' 
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trading partners, through substantial trade deficits, to carry the whole 
burden of achieving an adjustment in the American balance of payments. 
The United States in 1971, according to American st.atistics, had a 
deficit in official reserve transactions of $29.8 billion. This was an increase 
of $20 billion over the $9.8 billion deficit in 1970. Of that payments 
deficit last year, only $2.9 billion was due to the trade deficit. Trade 
alone thus does not explain the American balance of payments deficit. The 
great bulk of the deficit was due to short- and long-ter.m capital outflows. 
Direct investment capital outflow, for example, maintained its high level · 
during 1971 and totaled more than $4. 5 billion. Such outflows in investment 
capital took place despite American programs to control foreign direct investment·. 
There is ~s concern over recent proposals by same American officials to remove 
these controls at the same time as attempting to turn around the balance of 
payments. 
These deficits in the American official reserve transactions, which were 
large even in the early Sixties, have been financed by limited American 
sales of gold but mainly by the accumulation of huge dollar holdings, especially 
by European central banks or liquid balances in the private sector, Eurodollars. 
Since August 15, 1971, there has been no dollar convertibility. 
VIII. TIIE ENLARGED mMUNI'IY 
The prospective entry into the Community of Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and 
Norway on January 1, 1973, is an event of major significance for the Ccmmmity 
and for the world. (See Table IV.) 
The United S~tes has steadfastly encouraged the Gammunity's enlargement. 
In July 1971, following the completion of the substantial part of t~ negotiations 
for British entry, President Nixon repeated this support in a letter to the 
Commission President. · 
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As noted above, the fonnation and developnent of the Camnuni ty has been 
beneficial for both the political and economic interest of the United States. 
There is every reason to expect that these benefits will continue and increase 
in the enlarged Community. 
One of the results of Conmuni ty enlargement for Pmerican exports will 
be a major lowering of industrial tariffs. As shown by the chart on page three, 
British tariffs on the average are higher than Community tariffs. In four 
steps ending July 1, 1977, the British tariff will be brought into line with 
the Community tariff. Preferential treatment presently given to products from 
Conmonweal th countries will also be phased out. The tariffs on same industrial 
and agricultural products from the four new members will be raised as a result 
of entry: Under GA'IT procedures, compensation via other tariff reductions 
will be given to any country that suffers such tariff increases. Negotiations 
for such compensations are expected to begin during 1972. 
Of perhaps ·more importance than tariff reductions for American exports 
is the stimulation of the British economy which entry is expected to bring 
about. Since 1958 the Ccmnunity Six have experienced a faster rate of growth 
than the overall European average. In part this was due to the dynamism 
of economic integration. An increment in the economic growth of the four is 
also now expected. SUch prosperity will make these countries, especially 
Britain, a better market for .American exports. 
The enlargement of the Community will also undoubtedly see a rationalization 
of Pmerican direct inves~nt in Europe. Britain and the Comnunity of Six 
are both areas of high Pmerican investment, and finns will now be able to plan 
. . 
expenditures for one large l.Dlified market of nearly 260 million consuners. 
At the end of 1970 the book value of direct Pmerican investment in the enlarged 
Caimuni ty was: 
-22-
Six $11,695,000,000 
Britain 8,01S,OOO,OOC 
Del11\ark 361,000,000 
Ireland 188,000,000 
Norway 269,000,000 
TOTAL $20,528,000,000 
The enlargement of the Cammmi ty affects not only the four new members 
but also the remaining members or associate members of the European Free 
Trade Association. EFTA established an industrial free trade area 
canprised of Britain, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Portugal. The six latter cotmtries, either because of neutrality 
or econanic underdevelopnent, cannot become full members of the Camnuni ty. 
At the same time, however, they do not wish to re-erect the tariff walls 
between themselves and the three departing EFTAmembers. Future trade relations 
with the enlarged Community are very important for these six EFTA cotmtries. 
The following amotmt of their trade will be \-li.th the Conmunity of Ten: 
Sweden 60 per cent, Austria 50 per cent, Finland 50 per cent, Switzerland 
50 per cent, Portugal 45 per cent, and Iceland 40 per cent. 
The COJIIlltUli.ty, therefore, has proposed and is now negotiating industrial 
free trade agreements with the six cotmtries. These will fully confor.m with 
the GA.'IT rules, which foresee the establishment of such free trade areas. 
In 1970 the United States exported $1.3 billion worth of industrial 
goods to these six EFrA cotmtries or 3.05 per cent of total .American exports. 
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CONCLUSIOO 
Since the end of World War II, the world has experienced a great liberalization 
of trade, which has helped to raise the standards of living in all cotmtries. 
The very existence of the European Economic Conmunity since 1958 has been a 
stimulus for free trade in Europe and in the world. Neither the Dillon Rotmd 
nor the Kermedy Rotmd would have been possible without .the existence of the 
Conmtmity. The Conmtmity will finnly support the new GATI negotiations due 
to start in 1973 and maintains that these. talks should pay particular attention 
not only to the interests of the industrialized countries but also to those 
of the developing nations. The Community is committed to freer world trade 
and rejects any incipient trends toward protectionism or mercantilism. 
The foundation of the European Conmunity and its developnent have been 
good for Europe; they have likewise been good for .America. The Conmuni ty 
has been the most important element in the postwar movement to bring the 
peoples of Western Europe together. It has resulted in peace and prosperity 
on a continent that has known much bloodshed. For the United States, as this 
report shows, the Conmunity and the policies it has followed since 1958 have 
benefited .American interests in trade, monetary relations, and inves'bnents. 
* * * 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
TABLE I 
EC-US TRADE BALANCE (1958-1971) 
(in billions of 1971 dollars) 
EXPORTS TO 
UNITED STATES 
1.664 
2.371 
2.242 
2.232 
2.447 
2.563 
2.849 
3.425 
4.098 
4.424 
5.769 
5.958 
6.634 
7.694 
IMPORTS FROM 
UNITED STATES 
2.808 
2.651 
3.830 
4.054 
4.458 
5.051 
5.438 
5.693 
6.022 
5.898 
6.393 
7.335 
9.040 
8.976 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities 
. , 
COMMUNITY DEFICIT 
IN TRADE WITH UNITED STATES 
- 1.144 
-
.280 
- 1.588 
- 1.822 
- 2.011 
- 2.488 
- 2 .. 589 
- 2.268 
- 1. 924 
- 1. 474 
-
.624 
- 1.377 
- 2.406 
- 1.282 
~ 
TABLE II 
A. Book Value of Direct US Investments in EC, 1958-1970 
(in billions of 1971 dollars) 
1958 1959 1960 196i 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
GERMANY .€66 .796 1.006 1.182 1.476 1. 780 2.082 2.431 3.077 3.486 3.785 4.276 4.579 
FRANCE .546 .640 .741 .860 1.030 1.240 1.446 1.609 1. 758 1.904 1.904 2.122 2.588 
ITALY • 280 • 315 .384 .491 .554 .668 .850 .982 1.148 1.246 1.275 1.422 1.521 
NETHERLANDS .207 • 245 . .283 .309 .376 .446 .593 • 686 .859 .942 1.069 1.227 1.495 
BELGIUM/LUX. • 208 • 211 .231 .262 • 286 .356 .455 .596 .742 .867 .981 1.214 1.510 
EC 1.908 2.208 2.644 3.104 3.722 4.490 5.426 6.304 7.584 8.444 9.012 10.255 11.695 
B. Book Value of Direct EC Investments in United States, 1960-1969 
(in billions of 1971 dollars) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
GERMANY .103 .120 .152 .149 .156 .209 .247 .318 .387 .617 .675 
FRANCE .168 .175 .183 .182 .197 .200 .215 .265 .288 .319 .294 
ITALY .071 .089 .lOO .102 .082 .087 .087 .086 .092 .095 .lOO 
NETHERLANDS .947 1.023 1.082 1.134 1.231 1.304 1.402 1.508 1.750 1.966 2.121 
BELGIUM/LUX. .157 .151 .158 .161 .175 .175 .193 .228 .273 .309 .338 
EC 1.446 1.558 1.675 1. 728 1.841 1.975 2.144 2.405 2.790 3.306 3.528 
Source: Survey of Current Business, US Department of Commerce 
TABLE Ill 
Official Reserves at the End of 1971(l) 
(in billions of US dollars and Units of Account (UC)* or Special Drawing Rights) 
IMF Reserve 
Total in Total Gold Per Cent SDR Value Per Cent Position 
UC or SDR in New Value in of in New of Value in 
Dollars New Dollars Total Dollars Total New Dollars 
BELGIUM/LUX. 3.199 3.473 1.676 48.3 6.440 12.7 0.651 
GERMANY 17.189 18.662 4.426 23.7 0.493 2.6 1.171 
FRANCE (2) 6.905(P)** 7.494** 3.523** 46.9 0.347** 4.6 0.421** 
ITALY (3) 6.251 6.787 3.131 46.1 0.247 3.6 0.378 
NETHERLANDS 3.497 3.797 2.073 54.6 0.619 16.3 0.699 
EC "6" 37.041 40.213 14.829 36.9 2.146 5.3 3.320 
DENMARK 0.664 0.721 0.069 9.6 0.049 6.8 0.057 
UNITED KINGDOM 6.062 5.015*** 0.778*** 15.5 0.553*** 11.0 
IRELAND 0.917 0.996 0.017 1.7 0.029 2.9 . 0.038 
NORWAY 1.063 1.154 0.036 3.1 0.060 5.2 0.067 
EC 1110" 45.757 48.099 15.729 32.7 2.837 5.9 3.482 
CANADA 5.249 5.699 0.860 15.1 0.404 7.1 0.361 
SWITZERLAND 6.416 6.966 3.158 45.4 
JAPAN 14.147 15.359 0.737 4.8 0.307 2.0 0.532 
SWEDEN 1.022 1.110 0.217 19.5 0.079 7.1 0.091 
UNITED STATES 12.148 13.190 11.080 84.0 1.190 9.0 0.630 
(1) Source: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics) 
(2) Bank of France 
(3) Bank of Italy 
(P) Approximate figure 
* 1 uc = $1.08571 
** Figure of November 1971 
*** Figure of September 1971 
Per Cent 
of 
Total 
18.7 
6.3 
6.0 
5.6 
18.4 
·8.3 
7.9 
3.8 
5.8 
7.2 
6.3 
3.5 
8.2 
4.8 
Foreign Exchange 
Per Cent 
Value in of 
New Dollars Total 
o.7o6 20.3 
12.571 67.4 
3.203** 42.6 
3.030 44.6 
0.406 10.7 
19.916 49.5 
0.547 75.9 
3.684*** 73~5 
0.911 91.5 
0.992 86.0 
26.050 54.2 
4.074 71.5 
3.805 54.6 
13.783 89.7 
0.723 65.1 
0.280 2.1 
/ 
TABLE IV (1970) 
SIX TEN USA USSR JAPAN 
Population (in thousands) 189,787 257,242 205,395 244,000 103,540 
Gross National Product 485,200 637,400 933,300 288,000 179,180 (in millions of dollars) 
Imports (percentage of 18.3 25.8 17.2 5.1 8.1 
world total) (1) 
Exporu (percentage of 19.2 
world total) (1) 25.2 19.7 5.8 8.8 
Total Production Cereals 
(Average 1968/70 in 
69,161 91,187 192,966 160,145 1,742 
thousands of tons) 
Total Meat Production 11,669 16,216 23,227 9,250 1,136 (1969 in thousands of tons) 
Milk Products (1969 
in thousands of tons) 
75,834 98,924 52,707 81,500 4,513 
Primary Energy Production 330,828 520,356 2,151,397 1,386,090 71,392 (in thousands of tons coal 
equivalent) 
Primary Energy Internal 845.8 1,235.8 2,250.6 379.6 
Consumption (in millions 
of tons coal equivalent) 
Petroleum Products Total 391.661 504,208 565,488 159,689 
Production (in thousands 
of tons) 
Total Gross Production 580,393 909,165 1,738,142 740,926 350,590 
of Electrical Energy (in 
billions of kilowatt hours) 
Steel Production (in 109,191 138,943 122,120 116,000 93,322 
thousands of tons) 
Motor Vehicles Production 8,029,000 9,670,000 6,550,000 348,000 3,179,000 
(passenger cars & commercial 
vehicles) 
Rail Transport 120,711 155,748 10,568 266,300. 181,921 (2) 
Passenger/Kms (millions) 
Merchant Shipping 1/7/70 28,656 77,317 18,463 14,832 27,004 
(thousands of tons) 
(1) All figures exclude intra-Community trade between the Six or the Ten. 
Figures for the United States, USSR, and Japan are percentages of world trade 
excluding intra-Community trade between the Ten. 
(2) 1969 
